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Abstract—Security is primarily concerned with protecting
assets from harm. Identifying and evaluating assets are there-
fore key activities in any security engineering process – from
modeling threats and attacks, discovering existing vulnera-
bilities, to selecting appropriate countermeasures. However,
despite their crucial role, assets are often neglected during
the development of secure software systems. Indeed, many
systems are designed with fixed security boundaries and as-
sumptions, without the possibility to adapt when assets change
unexpectedly, new threats arise, or undiscovered vulnerabilities
are revealed. To handle such changes, systems must be capable
of dynamically enabling different security countermeasures.
This paper promotes assets as first-class entities in engineering
secure software systems. An asset model is related to require-
ments, expressed through a goal model, and the objectives of an
attacker, expressed through a threat model. These models are
then used as input to build a causal network to analyze system
security in different situations, and to enable, when necessary, a
set of countermeasures to mitigate security threats. The causal
network is conceived as a runtime entity that tracks relevant
changes that may arise at runtime, and enables a new set
of countermeasures. We illustrate and evaluate our proposed
approach by applying it to a substantive example concerned
with security of mobile phones.
Keywords-Security requirements, Adaptation, Causal reason-
ing
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is concerned with protecting assets from harm.
Identifying assets in the system-to-be and estimating their
values are usually the initial steps of security requirements
engineering [1]. Based on these assets, other security con-
cerns, such as threats, attacks, vulnerabilities, security goals
and countermeasures, are determined. Assets may evolve
dynamically while a system is operating. For example, an
asset’s value can change, new assets can be added within the
system boundary, or existing assets may no longer be under
the system’s protection anymore. These changes may affect
the system’s security concerns and the risk of harm. For
example, an increase in the value of assets could increase the
motivation of attackers, raise the threat level (i.e., probability
of a threatening event occurring), and thus could increase the
likelihood of successful (harmful) attacks. Certain security
goals may become more critical if additional valuable assets
need to be protected. Potential loss can also increase if an
asset is compromised. Countermeasures, which are applied
to mitigate security vulnerabilities, may also need to be
strengthened to prevent greater losses.
Despite their central role in the security domain, assets
are not treated as first class entities in the requirements engi-
neering process, and are not used to drive system adaptation
at runtime. Moreover, systems are often developed based
on fixed security boundaries and assumptions, without the
possibility to adapt when assets change unexpectedly, new
threats arise, or undiscovered vulnerabilities are found.
For these reasons, this paper aims to integrate adaptive
security (also called self-protection [2]) from the early stages
of requirements modeling to the enactment of systems at
runtime. We treat assets as first-class entities to enable some
adaptation activities, namely, analysis and decision-making.
Assets and other security concerns are modeled explicitly,
together with the other requirements. Requirements, includ-
ing security requirements, are represented through a goal
model, which is augmented with a representation of vulner-
abilities and countermeasures. Assets are expressed through
an asset model, while threats and attacks are represented
through a threat model.
To analyze the consequences of asset-relevant changes, we
build a causal network (inspired by influence diagrams [3]
and fuzzy cognitive maps [4]) from the asset, goal and threat
models. Causal links then allow us to explicitly represent
the effects of asset changes on other security concerns.
This representation can express causal relationships among
security concerns in a way that is amenable to change impact
analysis. It also enables us to evaluate the overall utility of
our countermeasures with respect to security goals.
Evaluating assets and their impact on security is usually
qualitative, and these parameters could not be usually quanti-
fied in a rigorous way. Our causal network supports the qual-
itative nature of asset evaluation and other security concerns,
such as the risk of possible attacks. We provide an analysis
mechanism for the causal network to estimate security risk
and identify the most appropriate countermeasures.
Our causal network is conceived as a runtime model to
track consequences of asset-relevant changes. These changes
can be detected by suitable monitors or can be provided
interactively by users. Some changes, such as adding or
removing assets, require the causal network to be restruc-
tured. These changes need to be captured by our security
model and then reflected in the causal network. At this
stage of our research, the evolution of the causal network
structure is performed manually. We applied and evaluated
our approach on a substantive example concerning security
of mobile phones. On one hand, the example provides
evidence that our causal network results in the appropriate
level of security, since an increase in the value of an asset
moves the system to a higher level of protection (i.e. using
stronger countermeasures), if necessary. On the other hand,
we use simulations to demonstrate the feasibility of our
analysis mechanism to generate plausible countermeasures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes the adaptive security problem and our motivating
(and running) example. Section 3 introduces our overall
approach. Section 4 explains our security model that com-
prises asset, goal, and threat models. Section 5 deals with
building the causal network based on the security model,
and the reasoning capabilities it offers. Section 6 describes
runtime adaptation using our causal network, and Section
7 discusses the experimental results evaluating the efficacy
of our approach. Section 8 reviews key related work, and
Section 9 concludes the paper.
II. ADAPTIVE SECURITY
Security requirements engineering is concerned with elic-
iting, representing and analyzing security goals and their
relationships with other security concerns, such as critical
assets, threats, attacks, risk, and countermeasures. However,
these concerns may change dynamically as the operating
environment or the requirements change. If these changes are
not addressed, some existing countermeasures may become
ineffective. Unfortunately, existing security requirements en-
gineering techniques (such as [5], [6]) do not support detect-
ing and managing runtime changes that specifically impact
security. Adaptive security aims to capture and analyze such
changes, and ultimately to enable countermeasures providing
a satisfactory level of protection.
A. Problem Statement
Adaptive security must address different kinds of changes
that may affect system security at runtime. For example,
adding a valuable asset to the system may demand a higher
level of protection, which in turn may require stronger
countermeasures. Security goals may change or may be
denied, in case some domain assumptions are no longer
valid. New threats and attacks may emerge, undiscovered
vulnerabilities may be appear, and existing countermeasures
may become ineffective. Adaptive security must cope with
the effects of these changes, which might compromise the
system and harm its assets.
In this paper, we focus on a part of the adaptive security
problem relating to asset variability as the main adaptation
trigger. Adding a new asset or increasing the value of an
existing asset can incentivize or discourage threat agents.
Asset-relevant events may also impact on security goals and
their criticality. When an asset is removed from a system,
related security goals may need to be removed or changed as
well. Finally, adaptive security must take into account risk
mitigation via selection and configuration of a proper set of
countermeasures. Note that, on one hand, countermeasures
support the satisfaction of security goals, but, on the other
hand, they can negatively impact usability, performance, or
other quality attributes of the system. This makes adaptive
security a multi-attribute decision-making problem that must
deal with the costs and benefits of countermeasures.
This paper does not address how assets can be monitored
and how adaptation actions can be applied to the system.
Instead, it addresses analyzing how asset variability impacts
on security and deciding how to adjust the protection level
accordingly.
B. Motivating Example
Mobile smart phones are equipped with a wide range of
applications that are increasingly used to perform personal
and business tasks. However, their increasing popularity
means that attackers and malicious users are more tempted
to harm valuable assets accessible from these devices. For
example, in the second quarter of 2011 the number of mobile
malware incidents doubled compared to the first quarter of
20091.
In this paper we use mobile phone security to illustrate
and evaluate our proposed approach. Our example is based
on a recent survey [7] of mobile malware. Typical assets
in a mobile phone include the phone itself, SIM (with mon-
etary phone credit), banking/credit card information, email
information (address, password and sent/received messages),
and contact lists. Threats to these assets include stealing
the phone, sending premium SMS messages, sending SMS
spam, and collecting sensitive information. Users may acci-
dentally give inappropriate permissions to applications, and
installed applications may not encrypt sensitive information
during transmission or storage. These vulnerabilities can
facilitate potential attacks.
In this domain, increasing the value of an asset (e.g., the
SIM card credit value) may increase the risk of loss. Adding
new assets to the model (e.g., manipulating information such
as credit card info details) may increase the threat level,
e.g., by increasing the probability of breaking confidentiality.
1www.mcafee.com/au/resources/reports/rp-quarterly-threat-q2-2011.pdf
When this information is no longer available on a mobile
phone, the corresponding security threat may diminish. In
this context, adaptive security aims to select an appropriate
configuration of countermeasures for the mobile phone in
each situation. An example is shown in Table I: when the
value of assets increases, countermeasures are adjusted.
Table I
POSSIBLE COUNTERMEASURE CONFIGURATIONS
SIM Mobile CC Info Countermeasures
Low Low Low PIN
Low High High PIN, Encrypt Sensitive Info
High High High Multi-factor authentication (PIN & finger print),
Encrypt Sensitive Info
III. OVERALL APPROACH
Our approach treats assets as first-class entities during
requirements modeling and runtime adaptation. As shown in
Figure 1, assets and security relevant entities are integrated
in the requirements model. Requirements are the starting
point to build a causal network, which will be used at
runtime to analyze the security risk and evaluate the utility of
all possible configurations of countermeasures. The outcome
of this analysis is used by an Adaptation Manager to select
the best configuration and (re-)configure the running system.
Goal Model
Threat Model
Asset Model
Causal Network
Assets
Adaptation
Manager
Running 
System
represent
(re-)trigger
use/access
build
(re-)
configure
Figure 1. A framework to support adaptive security.
We use the KAOS [8] goal model to represent functional
and non-functional requirements and its complementary
threat model [5] (anti-model) to represent threats and attacks.
The asset model explicitly represents assets in terms of
KAOS entities. Note that we extend the goal model with
an explicit representation of vulnerabilities, which may be
brought by domain assumptions or system operations. Each
vulnerability is linked to the attacks it facilitates. Security
goals in the goal model may be further decomposed into
concrete countermeasures. Section IV further elaborates
these three models and their relationships.
The causal network is defined by the elements and re-
lationships identified in the asset, goal, and threat models.
Each node assigns a specific semantics to the corresponding
security entity. For example, a node associated with a vulner-
ability represents presence (or the probability of presence) of
a system weakness. The network links identify positive and
negative causal relationships among security entities. For
example, the positive link between a vulnerability (V1) and
an attack (At1) has the following interpretation: an increased
value of V1 causes an increase in the probability of success
of At1. Our causal network also adds the concepts of risk
and utility. The former is necessary to evaluate the security
risk, while utility is fundamental to assess the advantages
and disadvantages of a certain set of countermeasures when
assets have specific values. Section V describes the causal
network in more detail.
Assets are used or may be accessed by the running system
at runtime and their value may change dynamically. For
this reason, assets’ values are monitored at runtime to tune
the causal network and (re-)trigger its analysis. For each
change in assets, the causal network will be updated and
new utility values will be re-calculated for all applicable
countermeasures. The most appropriate set of countermea-
sures is then selected by the Adaptation Manager, according
to corresponding utility values. The asset, goal, and threat
models can also change to accommodate new assets, remove
existing assets, or vary security goals. These modifications
are propagated onto the causal network by changing its
structure.
IV. ASSET, GOAL, AND THREAT MODELS
This section describes the main features of the asset, goal
and threat models with the aid of our mobile phone example.
A. Asset Model
The asset model represents assets and their relationships.
In our example, we considered assets shown in Figure 2
including the mobile phone itself, SIM card, the credit card
information and location data. Assets that are related to the
mobile phone, such as SIM and credit card information,
contribute to increase the phone value. The attacks that target
the mobile phone (e.g., stealing the phone) may harm the
related assets as well. Note that attacks that target credit card
information may also harm the bank account. However, the
boundary of our adaptive security problem does not consider
protecting the bank account. This was a realistic decision,
since each bank also has its own mechanisms to limit harm
(e.g., daily money withdrawal cap) and to detect unusual
activities (e.g., shopping from a new location).
B. Goal Model
The goal model represents the main objectives a system
must achieve or maintain, and decomposes them into func-
tional and non-functional requirements. This model includes
security goals, such as confidentiality, integrity, availability
and accountability (also known as CIAA). The priority
(criticality) of a security goal may depend on the value of
the asset that needs to be protected. Security goals have a
hierarchical structure and can be ultimately decomposed into
<<Asset>>
Mobile Phone
- value (brand)
<<Asset>>
SIM
- value (credit)
<<Asset>>
Credit Card Info
- value 
<<Asset>>
Email Contact
- value 
<<Asset>>
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Figure 2. The asset model for the example. (Dashed line: system boundary)
concrete (operational) countermeasures. Countermeasures
are functionalities to mitigate security risks (also known as
security controls or safeguards [9]). In this paper we focus on
preventive countermeasures, which avoid attempts to deny
security goals. Note that vulnerabilities may be brought by
system functionalities, including security countermeasures
and domain assumptions. For this reason, we include an
explicit representation of vulnerabilities in our goal model.
Countermeasures are related to the vulnerabilities they try to
mitigate, and a weight can be assigned to the link depending
on the effectiveness of each countermeasure.
Figure 3 depicts the goal model for our example. Ac-
countability and confidentiality are considered as security
goals, and six countermeasures are designed in the system
to achieve these goals. Six vulnerabilities are identified
for the illustrated functional requirements, including no
encryption of data in the device and root exploit (also called
“jailbreak”). Some security goals cannot be satisfied without
sacrificing other non-functional requirements, such as perfor-
mance and usability. The countermeasures applied to enforce
the satisfaction of security goals cannot be selected without
considering their side effects. For example, if the system
uses a stronger encryption algorithm, this countermeasure
may cause degradation in performance or usability.
C. Threat Model
A threat model (or anti-model) typically includes threat
agents (i.e. threat sources or counter-stakeholder), threat
goals, and attacks (i.e. threat actions). Threat agents can be
natural (e.g., flood), human (e.g., hacker), or environmental
(e.g., power failure) [9]. In this paper we do not consider
threat agents as a part of our anti-models, and we simply
represent their potential goals. Assets are linked to the threat
goals they motivate, while threat goals are associated with
the attacks that are performed for their achievement.
Threat goals represent motivations of threat agents to
attack a system. In our example, possible motivations [9]
include monetary gain, blackmail, destruction and compet-
itive advantage. Some of them can be directly associated
with the assets under protection and can be decomposed
into anti-goals (i.e. negation of security goals [5]) aimed at
compromising the targeted assets. This paper represents anti-
goals as KAOS obstacles [5]. Attacks are actions through
which threat goals can be achieved [9] and assets would
ultimately be harmed. Therefore, attacks can be modeled as
operationalizations of threat goals.
Figure 4 depicts the threat model of our mobile phone
example. The top goal is monetary gain and is decomposed
into stealing phone credit and collecting sensitive infor-
mation from the user device. Each of these anti-goals are
refined and then linked to attacks, which include phishing
and malware attacks. Note that anti-goals negate security
goals. For example anti-goal Collect Sensitive Info negates
Confidentiality.
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Figure 4. The threat model for the example.
V. THE FUZZY CAUSAL NETWORK
Causal networks are used in decision theory to support
qualitative (e.g., Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCM) [4]) and
quantitative (e.g., Bayesian decision networks [10]) analysis
and decision making. A causal network built from the
three discussed models enables us not only to analyze
consequences of asset-relevant changes, but also to perform
an impact analysis of potential decisions. However, the main
challenge is that quantitative analysis may not be always
feasible, due to incompleteness or imprecision of data. For
instance, quantitative risk evaluation is challenging [11],
since many threats might be rare or new. Entities such as
risk and threat are intrinsically uncertain, but imprecision
adds another level of uncertainty that prevents us assigning
specific values to these entities. Therefore, we have to
deal with not only the uncertainty of occurrence of an
observable event, but also the imprecision and ambiguity
of event assessment. For other entities, such as assets, it is
not probability but imprecise evaluation that makes the value
uncertain.
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Figure 3. The goal model for the example.
To cope with such uncertainty, there are many techniques
that are based on probabilistic or fuzzy values. Although,
in the first category solutions like probability intervals [12]
for example can be used for risk assessment, but only if
the entities are probabilistic in nature. On the other hand,
techniques based on fuzzy values can cover all entities in our
three models, even those with uncertain probabilities. Indeed
in risk assessment, linguistic terms (e.g., ’high’, ’medium’,
and ’low’) and intuitive judgements of domain experts can be
better expressed by fuzzy values. Therefore, a fuzzy causal
network seems a natural fit to our problem, and we still retain
the possibility of benefiting from any precise quantitative
evidence, if it is available. Our proposed causal network is
inspired by FCMs [4], a well-known fuzzy causal network.
However, we enriched the network with utility and decision
nodes from the influence diagrams [3] to support decision
making.
A. Building the Fuzzy Causal Network (FCN)
Our proposed Fuzzy Causal Network (FCN) is built
upon the elements and links represented in the asset, goal,
and threat models. Similar to an influence diagram, our
causal network has three types of nodes [13]: chance nodes
representing uncertain domain entities significant for causal
reasoning (denoted by ovals), decision nodes indicating
decisions to be made (denoted by rectangles), and utility
nodes corresponding to the fitness value of the network
configuration (denoted by a hexagon). Table II lists the
nodes of our FCN. Except for the utility node, all the others
are represented by fuzzy variables in the range [0, 1]. This
allows us to initialize and analyze nodes whose values are
imprecise. The asset node is associated with its value (or
criticality), threat with the threat level, and attack with its
probability of success. A vulnerability node shows the pres-
ence or the probability of presence of a system weakness.
NFRs are nodes associated with the satisfaction level of non-
functional requirements other than security (e.g., usability or
performance) to represent side-effects of countermeasures.
Each security goal represents its satisfaction value as a
fuzzy variable. We incorporated logical AND-OR relations
between security goals, which are directed from offsprings
to parents.
Table II
NODES IN THE CAUSAL NETWORK
Node Meaning Type
Asset (As) Value Chance
Threat (T) Threat level Chance
Attack (At) Probability of success Chance
Security goal (SG) Satisfaction level Chance
Vulnerability (V) Presence of vulnerability Chance
Non-Functional Requirements (NFR) Satisfaction level Chance
Partial Risk (PR) Partial risk of an attack Chance
Total Risk (TR) Risk of all attacks Chance
Countermeasure (CM) Strength Decision
Utility (U) Value Utility
Figure 5 depicts the abstract structure of our FCN. The
proposed FCN is a directed graph, and each causal link in
the FCM is labeled with a signed weight, which represents
the strength of causal relationship between two nodes of
the network. A positive causal link, A
+
−→B, means that
increasing A causes increasing B, while a negative causal
link, A
−
−→B, means that increasing A causes decreasing B.
A high/low weight for a positive or negative causal link
means that an increase of A may cause a great/small increase
or decrease of B. While generally weights can be fuzzy
labels, as in the FCM, in this paper we used quantitative
labels in the [1, 0] interval. Note that the FCN is an acyclic
graph, and the loops in Figure 5 are between different chance
nodes; e.g., between two assets such as Credit Card Info and
Mobile.
Chance nodes - Except the countermeasure, all entities
taken from the three predefined models are chance nodes
in the FCN. The value of an asset also depends on other
related assets (see positive link between assets in Figure 5).
For example, the value of a Mobile phone increases when
the value of the enclosed information and the SIM card
increases, which implies positive causality. The value of
assets also has a positive impact on the threat level, since,
in case of an attack, the loss would be higher. For example,
the higher the value of the enclosed information, the higher
the level of Steal Mobile Phone threat.
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Figure 5. The abstract model of the fuzzy causal network
Threat nodes propagate their values down to their off-
spring, as in the threat model (shown by the positive link
between threats in Figure 5) and finally to their underlying
attacks (the link between threats and attacks), since threats
increase the probabilities of attacks. For example, the Steal
Mobile Phone threat propagates its value to Access Data On
Stolen Phone. The probability of an attack is also affected
by the presence of a set of vulnerabilities. For example, the
success of Access Data On Stolen Phone depends on the
presence of the V5 vulnerability. The higher the probability
of this vulnerability, the higher the probability of Access
Data On Stolen Phone to succeed.
The value of each security goal is its satisfaction level
that depends on subgoals and corresponding countermea-
sures. But the asset value has also influence on how the
satisfaction level and criticality of associated security goals
are determined (see the link between assets and security
goals). The strength level of a countermeasure impacts the
corresponding security goals and propagates upwards in
the goal model following the semantics of AND/OR fuzzy
operators (i.e. min/max). For example, the Confidentiality
goal is affected by the Credit Card Info, Location Data, and
Email Contact assets, and the PIN, Iris, Finger, Encrypt
Sensitive Info countermeasures.
Partial risk and total risk are chance nodes with no
counterparts in the asset, goal and threat models. A partial
risk node is created for each attack to estimate the corre-
sponding risk, and the total risk aggregates all the partial
risks. Partial risk estimation follows the general definition of
risk, which is the probability of an attack multiplied by the
possible resulting loss. Therefore, each partial risk depends
on the value of the targeted assets, i.e., the loss factor, and
the probability of the related attack (see positive links from
assets and attacks to partial risk in Figure 5). For example,
the partial risk of Malware depends on the probability of the
attack and the value of contained information.
Decision nodes - Each countermeasure is a decision
node in the causal network. Vulnerabilities can be mitigated
through the application of suitable countermeasures (see the
link between countermeasures and vulnerabilities). For ex-
ample, the Encrypt Sensitive Info countermeasure mitigates
V5. On the other hand, a countermeasure may deteriorate
or improve the satisfaction level of some non-functional
requirements (see the link between countermeasures and
NFRs). For example, Encrypt Sensitive Info has a negative
impact on Performance. The countermeasure value is as-
sociated with its strength level in mitigating vulnerabilities.
Some countermeasures, such as confirmation, are crisp since
they can be enabled or disabled, while others, such as
encryption, are fuzzy multi-value variables since they may
have values between zero and one. For encryption, the value
depends on the length of the key or the algorithm adopted.
The utility node - This node expresses the effectiveness
of selected countermeasures, according to the total risk, the
satisfaction of security goals and impacts on NFRs. The
utility node should aggregate all these costs and benefits.
Benefits depend on how much countermeasures can mitigate
the risk, and costs indicate how much they hurt other NFRs.
The risk and NFR nodes have a negative impact on the
utility, while security goals have a positive impact. For
example, the utility of applying the PIN countermeasure
benefits the authentication, while a long pin has a negative
impact on usability. By changing the value of this node, a
different utility value can be determined.
Figure 6 illustrates a part of the causal network for
our example. Chance nodes are defined based on entities
essential for adaptation in the asset, goal and threat models.
For each attack node, we add a partial risk node to the
network. In Figure 6, malware and access data on stolen
phone risk nodes are two samples of these partial risks.
Then, the network is augmented with the total risk and
utility nodes. Each of these nodes, aggregate their inputs
depending on its semantics, as will be elaborated in the next
section. The next step is to establish causal links between
the nodes. Links in the security models are not enough for
this purpose, and additional information from the domain
experts and security requirements artifacts are required. For
instance, risk assessment artifacts help defining links to
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Figure 6. A part of the causal network for the mobile phone example
partial and total risk nodes. Assigning weights also needs
domain knowledge, although the weights normally require
adjustment.
B. Utilizing the FCN in Adaptation
The FCN is set to analyze the impact of asset variability
on security, particularly risk, and select the most appropriate
countermeasures to mitigate risk at runtime. The analysis
and decision-making are performed using causal reasoning
on the FCN. This section describes how this can be done.
Evaluating nodes - Each node in the FCN needs to
aggregate causal effects from input links. This may be dif-
ferent for each node depending on the attributed semantics.
Table III shows the aggregation functions we used in each
node. The term {A} → B denotes the set of nodes of
type A that are causally affecting B. Aggregation functions
are selected from the set of these functions: Minimum,
Maximum, Average and Sum. The Sum function is selected
for the utility node, since it is not a fuzzy variable and
accumulates risk, NFRs and security goals. For all the other
nodes, selecting one of the other three functions indicates
how much we want to intensify the output based on inputs.
The Maximum function is more conservative, because for
instance if we use Maximum to aggregate causal effects of
several assets to an asset, countermeasures would have been
over strengthened. We selected Average for this purpose
to take the middle level between conservative and relaxing
aggregations. Note that the aggregating functions are applied
after applying weights to each input, which means by tuning
weights we can adjust the input-output mapping.
In some cases there are more sets in the left side of the
causal link; e.g., {As}, {CM} → SG. In these cases, the
reasoning mechanism initially aggregates the same type links
and then combines different types. For example to evaluate
SG, first the effects of {As} on SG are aggregated by
the Maximum function since asset protection is extremely
important and associated goals should be promoted (being
more critical). Then the impacts from {CM} are combined
with the Maximum function, because links between counter-
measures connected to an SG is OR (as shown in Figure 3).
Finally these two effects are aggregated by the Minimum
function, which is more conservative for SG. This means
the lower the goal value, the higher the chance of having a
stronger countermeasure.
Table III
AGGREGATING CAUSAL EFFECTS
Causal Link Aggregation
{As} → As Average
{As} → T Maximum
{T} → At Maximum
{V } → At Average
{T}, {V } → At Minimum
{As} → SG Maximum
{CM} → SG Maximum
{As}, {CM} → SG Minimum
{CM} → V Average
{CM} → NFR Average
{As} → PR Maximum
At → PR No aggregation (only one attack)
{As}, At → PR Minimum
{PR} → TR Maximum or Average
TR, {SG}, {NFR} → U Sum
Alternatively, Minimum and Maximum in the min/max
fuzzy inference means multiplication and addition. To eval-
uate the partial risk PR, the loss factor (asset effect) should
be multiplied by probability of attack, which is translated
into the Minimum function. For aggregating partial risk to
total risk, the Maximum function makes sense, because it
means adding up partial risks. But we consider two options
of Maximum and Average in Section VI to investigate the
effect of each option on risk calculation.
Initialization and tuning - Before reasoning, the nodes
and weights on causal links should be initialized. The
initial values may come from stakeholders, domain experts,
security requirements artifacts and existing evidence (e.g.,
statistical data). Initial values of countermeasures are the
default security settings that may be changed later by the
FCN at runtime. Note that sometimes, some countermea-
sures may not be available (e.g., failed) or disabled by the
user. The weights of the causal links should be tuned based
on existing qualitative and quantitative evidence. We used
sensitivity analysis to investigate the behavior of output
in different configurations and tune the weights. The next
section discusses sensitivity analysis in more detail.
The asset evaluation, in particular, has a significant impact
on the effectiveness of decision making in adaptation. A
report published by Symantec offered values for some of the
assets in our mobile phone in the underground market [14],
but users may evaluate these assets differently. In our exam-
ple, we considered that assets are evaluated from the user’s
viewpoint. This could be rather conservative in some cases.
For example, a user location may be more valuable to an
attacker than to the user himself.
Runtime Reasoning - At runtime, after any changes
in assets, the FCN should be re-evaluated and counter-
measures should be changed if necessary. We call the set
of countermeasures a security configuration, or simply a
configuration. First, the value of the changed asset(s) is
updated and then the causal effect through outward links
will affect connected assets, threats and security goals, as
shown in Figure 5. These effects will be propagated through
other links towards the utility node. To avoid an infinite
update without convergence, we specified a threshold (a
convergence criterion): in case the value of a node does not
change more than the specified threshold, the computation
of the value at that node can terminate.
Every time a change in the assets takes place, the
maximum expected utility needs to be specified for the
given network state. For this purpose, different values of
decision nodes, i.e., countermeasures, should be tried. While
searching for the best utility would be time-consuming
and can be more efficient by applying heuristics, in this
paper we consider a global search to evaluate all possible
countermeasures. As noted before, we used a modified
version of FCM [4] in the causal network. We used the
original FCM reasoning mechanism, implemented in JFCM
(http://jfcm.megadix.it/), and extended it to first consider
decision and utility nodes, and then to incorporate AND-
OR relationships between goal nodes. Assets impact directly
connected security goals, while countermeasure effects prop-
agate bottom up through the goal structure’s AND-OR links.
VI. SIMULATION
As a part of the evaluation of our work, we built the
requirements model and the fuzzy causal network for our
mobile phone example, and conducted several experiments
in a simulation in order to determine the efficacy of our
causal network. The network was evaluated with the three
following scenarios:
Scenario 1 (S1): In the first scenario the causal network
includes three assets: mobile phone, credit card information
and phone credit (SIM). We assume that there is no coun-
termeasure for malware attacks. Therefore, malware might
be installed, and might harm valuable assets.
Scenario 2 (S2): The second scenario is removing an asset
from the system. In our example, credit card information
(CC info) is removed from the phone. In this case, we are
interested in knowing how the FCN changes the counter-
measures after removing the asset, and also when there is
no CC info how the variability of other assets adjusts the
configuration.
Scenario 3 (S3): In the third scenario, we assume that we
have all the three assets in S1, and we add a countermeasure
to avoid installing malware applications, which is checking
the authenticity of digital signatures before installing appli-
cations.
The main objective of our simulation was to assess if
the causal network efficiently suggests reasonable counter-
measures, which mitigate existing vulnerabilities. For this
purpose, we conducted a set of six experiments based on
the above scenarios, after running a sensitivity analysis.
A. Sensitivity Analysis
We ran a sensitivity analysis before the experiments for
two reasons. First, we wanted to tune the weights based on
the mapping of asset changes to utility values. We generated
different combinations by changing values of the assets from
low to high, to analyze the effects on the other security
concerns. We also varied the strength of the countermeasures
to better understand the changes in the utility value. For the
sensitivity analysis, we assume that the initial values of the
nodes have a uniform distribution.
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Figure 7. Utility Box plots with max and average aggregation for S1-S3
Second, we were interested in investigating the effect
of selecting Maximum or Average aggregation function for
total risk calculation. Figure 7 shows Box plots of utility
values in the scenarios for the two aggregation functions.
Utility values for Maximum are negative because of select-
ing stronger countermeasures. Both functions selected the
same configuration for the best utility in S2, while in S1 and
S3 Maximum chose the more secure one. S1 to S3 generated
27000, 5400 and 54000 different cases respectively, and the
network was updated in maximum six iterations.
Generally, using the Maximum function leads to selection
of stronger countermeasures that may have an adverse im-
pact on other NFRs. On the other hand, the Average function
may offer countermeasures that are less strong, but only
slightly deteriorate other NFRs. If security requirements are
deemed more important, the Maximum function is selected,
otherwise the Average function is chosen.
Table IV
SAMPLE CONFIGURATIONS (H:HIGH, VH: VERY HIGH, M: MEDIUM, L: LOW, EN:ENABLE, DS:DISABLE, S:STRONG, N/A: NOT AVAILABLE)
Assets Attacks Countermeasures
Scenario SIM CC info Malware Phishing Send SMS SMS Blacklist Encrypt Finger Iris PIN SMS Conf. App cert.
S1 VH(1) VH(1) VH(1) VH(1) VH(1) S(1) S(1) Ds(0) En(1) Ds(0) Ds(0) N/A
S1 L(0.3) VH(1) VH(1) M(0.5) L(0.3) M(0.5) S(1) En(1) Ds(0) Ds(0) Ds(0) N/A
S2 VH(1) N/A VH(0.9) VH(0) VH(1) S(1) Ds(0) Ds(0) Ds(0) Ds (0) Ds(0) N/A
S2 L(0.3) N/A VH(0.9) M(0.5) L(0.3) M(0.5) Ds(0) Ds(0) Ds(0) Ds(0) Ds(0) N/A
S3 VH(1) VH(1) VH(1) VH(1) VH(1) S(1) S(1) En(1) Ds(0) M(0.5) En(1) En(1)
S3 L(0.3) VH(1) VH(1) M(0.5) L(0.3) M(0.5) S(1) En (1) Ds(0) Ds(0) Ds(0) En(1)
B. Configuration Selection
At runtime, changing the asset value may cause an in-
crease in risk, and the system may need to modify its coun-
termeasures accordingly. To select countermeasures with the
best utility we used a global optimal strategy. Table IV
shows a set of configurations selected for S1-S3 using the
Maximum risk aggregation function. For each scenario, two
cases are evaluated: first, very high value of phone credit
(SIM) and credit card information (CC info), and, second,
low value of SIM and very high value of CC info. These
cases are shown in the first and second rows of each scenario.
In S1, lowering the SIM card value results in reducing the
possibility of sending premium SMS and slightly lowers the
possibility of success of phishing attacks. The asset change
leads to decreasing the level of countermeasures related to
authentication and accountability, which intuitively makes
sense. The iris checking is changed to fingerprint matching,
which improves the usability and performance of the system.
In S2, no payment information is stored in the phone.
Again, lowering the SIM card value reduces the possibility
of sending premium SMS. The causal network only suggests
adding a blacklist countermeasure, which again intuitively is
a reasonable choice.
In S3, decreasing the asset value also shows a decrease in
the required protection level. Interestingly the single factor
authentication countermeasure provides higher utility than
the multi-factor authentication. The fingerprint authentica-
tion, which is stronger than PIN, is still enabled. The SMS
confirmation can be disabled to provide better usability,
since the SIM card has a reduced value. In all these cases,
usability of suggested configurations is high and the impact
on the performance is medium. For each situation, the FCN
generates the ranked list of configurations in less than 1ms.
VII. RELATED WORK
Autonomic computing [2] research has considered two
aspects of self-protection: defending against malicious at-
tacks and cascading failures, and anticipating problems and
avoiding them. Existing solutions mostly do not consider ap-
plication security [15], while a view re-enforced by Ghosh et
al. [16] argued that we still need to protect applications from
“ambiguous security policies, data-driven attacks through
allowed services, and insider attacks”.
In security requirements engineering, the main objective
is to consider security earlier in the development life cy-
cle [17]. As noted previously, van Lamsweerde [5] proposed
a dual model composing goals and anti-goals to elaborate
security requirements. We have argued in this paper that an
asset model should also be added and linked to the security
requirements model. Haley et al. [1] noted that although
knowing the goals of attackers may be useful for quantifying
harm, security is not a zero-sum game. This means success
of an attack will not necessarily render a security goal
denied. Therefore, we assumed that anti-models consist of
both motivations and anti-goals. In another work, Elahi
et al. [6] enriched the i* model by adding attackers and
vulnerabilities, without taking into account variability of
assets and its impact on security.
Requirements at runtime determine whether software has
deviated from the expected behavior. Fickas and Feather [18]
highlighted the importance of runtime requirements moni-
toring for evolution. Souza et al. [19] introduced awareness
requirements to monitor success and failure of requirements.
Baresi et al. [20] proposed fuzzy live adaptive goals to deal
with the denial of system goals using defined countermea-
sures. Salehie and Tahvildari [21] proposed a Goal-Attribute-
Action Model (GAAM) to represent runtime goals in an
ensemble for selecting adaptation actions. Our proposed
FCN is not on directly monitoring requirements but rather
on prevention as risks change.
There are few related contributions employing causal net-
works and decision trees in risk management. Sahinoglu [22]
built a decision tree by connecting vulnerabilities, threats
and countermeasures together for risk quantification. Al-
though the approach is promising, it suffers from the limita-
tions of decision trees (tree structure), and does not consider
assets and security goals. Few efforts on risk-adaptive solu-
tions have also been reported (e.g., [23] and [24]). Although
these efforts considered risk estimation, they ignored asset
variability as a source of risk change.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has proposed a novel approach to support
adaptive security, from requirements modeling to the enact-
ment of a system at runtime. Our approach promotes assets
as first-class entities. At design time, three models – of
assets, threats, and security requirements – are assembled
together. From these models, and by adding risk (partial
and total) and utility nodes, a causal network is built. At
runtime, changes in assets trigger the causal network, and the
outcome of reasoning over this network is a list of security
configurations with their associated utility values. Then the
most appropriate configuration is selected for adaptation. It
is worth noting again that in this paper we have not discussed
how to monitor assets and apply changes at runtime.
Linking assets to security concerns enables an adaptation
manager to understand the costs and benefits of counter-
measures in protecting assets, and to estimate the impact
of assets on the risk of possible threats and attacks that
may arise at runtime. Our simulations demonstrated that
risk assessment and utility evaluation are plausible: risk
increases when assets’ values increase and, in those cases,
stronger countermeasures are applied. We investigated the
effect of removing assets and adding countermeasures in
our experiments. Our proposed reasoning mechanism also
updated the network quickly during simulations.
The effectiveness of FCN depends on the completeness
of the three underlying models, which in turn relies on
the quality of security requirements and risk assessment.
Usability of the approach needs to be investigated in an em-
pirical study, but our approach mainly adds asset modeling,
linking assets to the other two models, and tuning the FCN
to a common security requirements engineering process.
Currently, these tasks are human-intensive, but automating
building and tuning the FCN seems viable. We used a global
search method to pinpoint the optimal security configuration,
but for better scalability we need to find a nearly optimal
solution using a search algorithm with possible heuristics.
To extend our work, we can consider other adaptation
triggers, such as changing vulnerabilities. We also plan to try
other fuzzy reasoning approaches and consider fuzzy labels
in our FCN. For example, in risk calculation both Maximum
and Average functions ignore some information from partial
risks that may change the total risk. A possible solution is
to add up partial risks and map the outcome to the range
[0, 1] using scalable monotonic chaining [25].
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